

## **PEAPA: Has CAADP Made a Difference?**

### **Conceptual Framework and Hypotheses**

[Future Agricultures Consortium](#), 2012

A first step to assessing the difference that CAADP has made / might make in a particular country is to describe the changes that CAADP seeks to achieve and the mechanisms that it incorporates to achieve those changes. At Maputo in 2003, African heads of state committed to the following three elements of the CAADP framework:

- An agricultural growth target (agricultural value added) of 6% p.a. leading to a reduction in hunger and poverty;
- A 10% target for the share of the national budget allocated to the agriculture sector. This may be considered as an intermediate target towards the ultimate achievement of the 6% p.a. agricultural growth target. It reflects the need for public investment in institutional and infrastructural public goods in order to “crowd in” the private investment (by farmers and other value chain actors) that will ultimately drive agricultural growth;
- The CAADP process for the development or refinement of a national agricultural strategy, leading to formulation of an investment plan and to commitments by government, donors and the private sector to invest in line with that plan.

Together these three elements are designed to strengthen political incentives for pro-poor agricultural policy. At the same time, CAADP (through its supporting organisations, such as NEPAD, regional economic communities and participating international donors) also seeks to provide technical and financial support for enhanced agricultural policy making and investment.

The CAADP “Theory of Change” thus embraces measures to tackle both political and technical constraints to pro-poor agricultural policy making and implementation in Africa. These are summarised in Table 1 (with pathways to stronger political incentives for pro-poor agricultural policy in green font and technical and financial support measures in blue font).

One of the fundamental assumptions of the PEAPA project is that political incentives drive observed agricultural policy and performance. In Africa we observe that these incentives are frequently weak. This suggests that the binding constraints to pro-poor agricultural policy making and implementation are more often political than technical.

Furthermore, when it comes to the interaction between domestic political forces and external actors, the PEAPA project has so far asserted the “primacy of domestic politics” in determining observed agricultural policy and performance outcomes. CAADP is a continent-wide initiative that has its roots in the 2003 Maputo Declaration of African heads of state. As such, it has strong African political ownership. However, because of its common approach applied across countries, the role ascribed to NEPAD and regional economic communities (RECs) within the CAADP process and the high level of donor support in recent years, at country level it can still be experienced as an “external” intervention. Cross-country analysis of the experience and impacts of the CAADP process thus allows us to explore the validity of the assumption of the “primacy of domestic politics”.

Table 1: CAADP “Theory of Change”

Pathways to better agricultural policy and/or performance	CAADP Element	Pathways to better agricultural policy and/or performance
	6% p.a. agricultural growth target → reduction in hunger and poverty	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Higher profile of agriculture within national political debates and policy priorities;</li> <li>- Increased national ownership of agricultural policy making;</li> <li>- Greater accountability for agricultural policy and performance to: i) “peers” (i.e. other states within the region or continent), ii) civil society groups, iii) donors (through the <i>Mutual Accountability Framework</i>);</li> <li>- Enhanced monitoring and evaluation of agricultural policy and performance</li> </ul>
- Increased funding for agricultural policy making and investment	10% annual budget share target	
	CAADP process	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Increased participation of non-state actors in policy formulation;</li> <li>- Increased level of technical expertise available to inform policy;</li> <li>- Enhanced aid coordination in support of agricultural policy</li> </ul>

The overarching questions for this second phase of the PEAPA work are thus:

*How do domestic political incentives for agricultural policy (analysed in the first phase of PEAPA work) influence*

1. *the nature of a country’s engagement with the CAADP process?*
2. *the impact (“value added”) of CAADP on agricultural policy and politics?*<sup>1</sup>

Our initial hypotheses in relation to these questions are as follows:

1. Countries where there are strong political incentives for pro-poor agricultural policy (e.g. Rwanda, Ethiopia, Burkina Faso)<sup>2</sup> will:
  - Embrace CAADP (evidenced, for example, by early implementation, strong domestic leadership of the CAADP process)

<sup>1</sup> This requires that we attempt to tackle the rather tricky issue of attribution: which change can we actually ascribe to CAADP?

<sup>2</sup> Whilst assessments of “pro-poor” or “supportive” agricultural policy are necessarily subjective, a defining characteristic of such policy is an emphasis on long-term investment in institutional and infrastructural investment in support of smallholder agricultural development.

- Seek the technical “value added” available through CAADP (e.g. technical assistance for policy formulation, monitoring and evaluation, enhanced donor coordination, additional funding for agricultural investment)
  - But not necessarily score highly on participation of non-state actors or accountability in the CAADP process, i.e. policy formulation remains tightly state-controlled.
2. Countries where there are weak political incentives for pro-poor agricultural policy (e.g. Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania) will:
- Make slow or halting progress with CAADP implementation, lacking strong domestic leadership of the CAADP process
  - Implement CAADP primarily to keep donors happy (“box ticking”) or to maintain face with other states/leaders. Retaining access to donor funding for the agricultural sector is likely to be an important motivation, with little evidence of demand for additional technical assistance for policy formulation, monitoring or evaluation. Enhanced donor coordination in support of agricultural policy may be a consequence of the CAADP process, but this will be driven by the donors themselves rather than demanded by the government
  - Not witness any real shift in political incentives as a result of the CAADP process (for example, through enhanced participation of non-state actors in policy formulation, greater national ownership of agricultural policy making or increased accountability of the relevant organs of government for agricultural policy and performance).